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INTRODUCTION

There is a silver lining to the stormy cloud brewing over Justice Antonin Scalia's crepe-covered seat. During his speech nominating Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, President
Barack Obama faulted Democrats and Republicans for their prior
positions on judges. "[T]here's been politics involved in nominations in the past" on both sides, Obama observed., He is right.
Over the past three decades, presidents and senators from both
sides of the aisle have ratcheted up the tension over Supreme
Court nominees. And the linchpin of that conflict is what has become an utterly meaningless ritual: the confirmation hearing. But
not for the reasons you may think.
The conventional wisdom is that, in their present form, judicial confirmation hearings serve no meaningful purpose. 2 This is
because nominees, who are rationally self-interested in being confirmed, refuse to answer any questions that could jeopardize their
prospects. Instead-the theory goes-when asked a controversial
question, the nominee filibusters and obfuscates. Candidates of
both parties are trained through rigorous "murder boards"3 to provide answers that are designed to shed as little light as possible
on how they would behave as judges.
The end result was accurately described by one legal scholar
two decades ago: "When the Senate ceases to engage nominees in
meaningful discussion of legal issues, the confirmation process
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1 Transcript:Obama Announces Nomination of Merrick Garland to Supreme Court
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Elena Kagan, Book Review, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U Chi L Rev
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takes on an air of vacuity and farce, and the Senate becomes incapable of either properly evaluating nominees or appropriately
educating the public."4 That scholar was Justice Elena Kagan.

Perhaps because of her astute awareness of this phenomenon, to
ensure her own confirmation, the former Harvard Law School
dean and solicitor general did what they all do: deftly navigated
between the straits of Scylla's vacuity and Charybdis's farce.
However, the conventional wisdom is based upon an incomplete account of how the hearings have devolved. While we agree
that the current dysfunctional state of the confirmation process
stems from the failed appointment of Judge Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court, there is a widespread misunderstanding of what
exactly went wrong at the Bork hearing. We contend that the
types of questions asked by both Democratic and Republican senators-at that hearing and since-assume a "legal realist" emphasis on results rather than on legal reasoning. The focus has
been on cases of the Court rather than on clauses of the Constitution. Each side is trying to get nominees to tip their hand on how
they will decide cases that each side cares about. But there is a
better way.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. First, we identify three
distinct "moves" that allow nominees to skate away from questions that might reveal that they would reach the "wrong" results
in future cases. Second, we demonstrate how a focus on the meaning of clauses of the Constitution, rather than the cases before the
Supreme Court, can fundamentally transform how hearings are
conducted. Third, we explain how the gravitational pull of
originalism can tug future justices, and ultimately the Supreme
Court itself, closer to the original understanding of the Constitution. This approach would improve public confidence in the
courts, and encourage presidents to be more mindful of the text of
the Constitution, rather than outcomes, when selecting nominees.
Before we proceed further, we will place our cards on the table. We are originalists, and we would like to see more originalist
justices on the Court. Our objective is, therefore, not neutral between constitutional approaches. Because of this, we believe the
changes we recommend would be salutary for the entire body politic, even if they would make the confirmation of livingconstitutionalist judges a bit more challenging.

4

Kagan, 62 U Chi L Rev at 920 (cited in note 2).
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Our proposed approach seeks to restore the lost confirmation,
where the focus on the text and history of our "republican" Constitution-the truly immutable characteristics of our fundamental law-is paramount and timeless. But we believe that even "living constitutionalists" should prefer the meaningful process we
describe over the purposeless status quo. After all, very few nonoriginalists claim that the meaning of the text at the time of its
enactment is wholly irrelevant to its meaning today. And the
hearings we describe would give living constitutionalist nominees
the opportunity to taut their interpretive methodology over that
of originalism.
I. THE CONFIRMATION THREE-STEP

In recent years, to avoid a repeat of the Judge Bork fiasco,
executive branch murder boards have carefully prepared nominees to hew to a precise script, involving three distinct intellectual "moves":
Move One. Profess fealty to the text of the Constitution-and
even to its original meaning-but especially to the more general
"principles underlying the text."5
Move Two. Profess fealty to stare decisis even when-make
that especially when-the Court's precedents have deviated from
original meaning in ways that meet with contemporary political
approval.6
Move Three. When asked to apply any of the Court's precedents to the current cases or controversies of most concern to the
senators, decline to answer on the ground that the case may later
come before the Court.7
Through this approach, the justice-to-be delicately follows the
senators' lead along the confirmation tightrope-saying just
enough to bolster the confidence of senators from the nominating
president's party, while providing as little ammunition as possible to senators from the other party.

5
See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 Const Commen
405, 405, 411-13 (2007) (discussing how Professor Jack Balkin makes this move in the
context of his theory on living constitutionalism); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Navigating
the Path to Supreme Appointment, 38 Fla St U L Rev 537, 587 (2011).
6
See, for example, Rhodes, 38 Fla St U L Rev at 587 (cited in note 5) (arguing that
one of the reasons that Kagan was successfully nominated was that "[s]he referred to precedent as an 'enormously important principle of the legal system"').
7 See, for example, id at 588 (arguing that one of the reasons Justice Clarence
Thomas was approved by the Senate was that he refused to answer any questions on Roe
v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973), because doing so would "compromis[e] his impartiality").
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Confirmations during the post-Bork world have demonstrated several disquieting trends from both Republican and
Democratic nominees to the Supreme Court. They all profess fidelity to the text of the Constitution-to the principles it establishes if not to its original meaning-but then all profess fidelity
to the precedents that the Senate values. Adhering to stare decisis helps both Republican and Democratic nominees avoid awkward questions about areas where the original meaning of the
text might lead to unpopular results. When coupled with a refusal
to answer questions about any issue that "might come before the
Court," confirmation hearings have been drained of any ability to
generate answers that can help senators criticize nominees.8
Like the television program Seinfeld, the hearings have become a show about nothing. When confronted with uncomfortable
questions, the nominees repeat a jurisprudential version of "yada
yada."9 But we believe this unfortunate state of affairs is enabled
because both Democrats and Republicans have embraced a legal
realist approach, if not to the Constitution itself, then to the practice of constitutional law. In essence, both sides believe-or act as
if they believe-that the Constitution is whatever the Supreme
Court says it is. While they are nominees, the Constitution is
whatever the Supreme Court has said it was in the past; then,
after confirmation, the Constitution is whatever the nominees
(now justices) may wish it to be in the future. So senators and
nominees opine about two empty concepts.
The first is stare decisis or precedent: Will the nominee follow
the hallowed case of United States v Whatchamacallitor not? No
one thinks justices should follow every precedent, so the crucial
issue is picking and choosing which to follow and which to ignore.
On the tenth anniversary of his confirmation, Justice Samuel
Alito half-jokingly explained that stare decisis is "a [L]atin
phrase" that means "to leave things decided when it suits our purposes." 10 Unless they can explain how we know which precedents
to follow and which to reverse-apartfrom liking the resultspontification about stare decisis is really a show about nothing.
The second empty issue to be discussed is the bugaboo of "judicial activism" and its conjoined twin "judicial restraint," which
8
See id at 562 n 142 ("The uneasy compromise of the Senate Judiciary Committee
has been that Senators are free to ask any questions, and the nominee is free to refrain
from answering as a result of the impropriety of the question.").
9 Television Broadcast, Seinfeld, Season 8, Episode 19: "The Yada Yada" (NBC, Apr
24, 1997).
10 Josh Blackman, Justice Alito Reflects on His Tenth Anniversary on #SCOTUS,
(Josh Blackman's Blog, Sept 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/MU3Z-DXMS.
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today's judicial conservatives have inherited from New Deal progressives.11 But what exactly is "activism"? Is it activism when
any popularly enacted law is held unconstitutional? Neither Democrats nor Republicans truly believe this, because they want
judges to strike down laws as unconstitutional when doing so
leads to the "right result" (but not when it does not).
For Democrats, invalidating the federal partial birth abortion
ban is the right result, 12 and for conservatives, invalidating the
Affordable Care Act is the right result.13 So judicial activism
means thwarting the "will of the people" when critics agree with
the people, while they complain about the "tyranny of the majority" when they disagree.14 Once again, this line of questioning
leads nowhere and reveals nothing.
We can do better. To restore the lost confirmation hearing,
we propose some modest changes in the way that senators ask
their questions to nominees.
II. CLAUSES, NOT CASES
Supreme Court confirmation hearings do not have to be about
either results or nothing. They could be about clauses, not cases.15
Instead of asking nominees how they would decide particular
cases, senators should ask them to explain what they think the
various clauses of the Constitution mean, separate and apart
from any Supreme Court precedent. (It is too easy merely to cite
a case and dodge the difficult question.) Does the Second Amendment protect an individual right to arms? What was the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
11 See Randy E. Barnett, OurRepublican Constitution:Securing the Liberty and Sovereignity of We the People 158-60 (Broadside 2016) (describing the rise of "judicial activism" from the previous Progressive mantra of "[j]udicial self-restraint").
12 See, for example, Caroline Burnett, Note, DismantlingRoe Brick by Brick-The
UnconstitutionalPurpose behind the Federal Partial-BirthAbortion Act of 2003, 42 USF
L Rev 227, 231 (2007) ("[T]he federal ban is unconstitutional because its only purpose is
to impose an undue burden on a woman's right to seek an abortion.").
13 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health InsuranceMandateIs Unconstitutional, 5 NYU J L & Liberty 581, 582 (2010)
("[T]he individual mandate is unconstitutional under ...
the Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses and the tax power."). See also Josh Blackman, Unprecedented: The
ConstitutionalChallenge to Obamacare39-44 (Public Affairs 2013) (chronicling the origin
of the constitutional challenge to the ACA's individual mandate).
14 See Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an "Activist" Court? The Commerce
Clause Cases, 73 U Colo L Rev 1275, 1275-76 (2002) (noting that "'activism' usually refers
to an action taken by a court of which the speaker disapproves").
15 See Randy E. Barnett, Clauses Not Cases, 115 Yale L J F 24, 24 (2006); Randy E.
Barnett and Josh Blackman, The Next Justices (Weekly Standard, Sept 14, 2015) archived
at http://perma.cc/8DLP-YL6X.
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Amendment? (Hint: it included an individual right to arms.)16
Does the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporate" the Bill of Rights
and, if so, how and why? Does the Ninth Amendment protect judicially enforceable unenumerated rights? Does the Necessary and
Proper Clause delegate unlimited discretion to Congress, or is
there room for judicial enforcement? Where in the text of the Constitution is the so-called Spending Power (by which Congress
claims the power to spend tax revenue on anything it wants) and
does it have any enforceable limits? Again, none of these questions should be answered with citations to the United States
Reports.
Senators do not need to ask how the meanings of these
clauses should be applied in particular circumstances-those
questions will be avoided by Move Three anyway. Just ask about
the meaning of the clause itself and how it should be ascertained.
Do nominees think they are bound by the original public meaning
of the text? Even those who deny this still typically claim that
original meaning is one "factor" or a starting point.17 If So, what

other factors do they think a justice should rely on to "interpret"
the meaning of the text?
Would it be unfair to ask nominees to the Supreme Court
what they believe the Constitution means and why they believe
it? We admit this would be challenging for anyone, including us.
But why should we not expect judicial nominees to have studied
the Constitution before they are given lifetime tenure to interpret
and apply the Constitution? And repeating the catechism of previous Supreme Court decisions is not the same thing as opining
on the meaning of the Constitution itself. Unless you assume, of
course, that the Constitution really is what the Supreme Court
says it is and nothing more. As justices, they will get to vote
whether they think these previously decided cases were rightly
decided. Their knowledge and perspective on this history is essential to understand before the Senate elevates them to the high
court.
Inquiring into clauses, not cases, would also require senators
to learn about the original meaning of the Constitution. Beyond
hearing the nominee's answers, it would be enlightening to hear
what the members of the Judiciary Committee think about these
16 Josh Blackman and Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora'sBox Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms in to the States, 8 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol 1, 51-54 (2010).
17 See, for example, Rhodes, 38 Fla St U L Rev at 587 (cited in note 5) (describing
Justice Kagan's judicial philosophy as articulated during her nomination hearing).
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topics. This would be a public service that would improve the process by which justices are appointed. Such a hearing would not
only be entertaining, it would be informative and educational. After all, it would be about the meaning of the Constitution, which
is to say that, unlike Seinfeld, it would be about something.
III. CONFIRMING ORIGINALISM'S GRAVITATIONAL PULL

The benefits of a confirmation hearing about clauses, not
cases, are manifold. First, it would eliminate the ritual of nominees pledging their fidelity to inherently inconsistent precedents
and doctrines. Second, the nominee would provide the senators,
and ultimately the American people-the true sovereigns l-with
a high profile dialectic on the text and history of our Constitution.
In truth, this was why Judge Bork's nomination hearings were so
riveting. Above all else, an originalist confirmation hearing would
restore an eroded faith in the judiciary. The nominees would
make clear to the American people that they are indeed deciding
cases based on our most fundamental laws, rather than on the
personal policy preferences of nine lawyers in Washington, DC.
We harbor no illusions that the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee all possess the sufficient knowledge to meaningfully engage in this line of questioning, beyond reading prepared
questions from staffers. But we do not need a cadre of originalist
senators. The beauty of our reform is that no rules need be
changed; no bipartisan agreement need be reached; and even the
Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee need not all be
of the same mind. For this approach to restore the lost confirmation hearing, we need only a senator or two to focus their limited
time on originalism. And we have full confidence that the Judiciary Committee counsel on both sides are quite capable of generating useful questions for the nominees. After all, it was a few
well-chosen questions from Senate Democrats that elicited the
highly revealing answers by Bork on the meaning of the Ninth
Amendment.
Imagine if a handful of senators grilled the next nominee on
questions of original meaning, and he or she proved utterly incapable of answering their questions, beyond perfunctory platitudes. Whenever the nominee reverted to discussing case law, the
senator would interrupt and say, "Judge, I am not interested in

18 See Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 Yale L J 2576,
2597-99 (2014) (discussing "We the People" as individuals and the conception of "individual popular sovereignty" that results).
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what is in the United States Reports. Once confirmed, you can
change that. I want you to discuss matters you cannot change,
like the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers, Blackstone's Commentaries, the records of the Constitutional Convention, records
of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other contemporaneous sources." Any effort to shift back to citing cases
should be swiftly halted. With such a rough going, the tenor of the
debate would immediately change. These questions are especially
critical given that the next nominee will fill the seat of Justice
Scalia, who ought to be canonized as the patron saint of originalism on the Court.
Unlike the sort of gotcha questions that have marked recent
hearings, these originalist questions are entirely fair game. Even
the most otherwise qualified candidate would be embarrassed by
a lack of knowledge of the meaning of particular clauses. What he
or she believes that meaning to be would reveal to the American
people how he or she will go about making decisions once no
longer controlled by stare decisis. The inquiring senators would
make the seminal point that the Constitution is not just what five
justices say it is-the Supreme Court does not have a monopoly
on interpreting the Constitution.
As happened after the failed Bork nomination, if a hypothetical nonoriginalist nominee is sunk-or even wounded-by his or
her lack of familiarity with the meaning of the Constitution's text,
all future nominees would seek to avoid that embarrassment. The
executive branch lawyers managing the nomination would insist
that nominees become versed in the sort of originalist questions
our hypothetical nominee stumbled on. And maybe the lawyers
will learn something in the process-that originalism is not as
indeterminate as the professoriate would suggest. Many cases
can be resolved by relying on this methodology. Further, original
meaning is often consistent with the outcomes of many of the canonical cases, such as Brown v Board of Education of Topeka.19
Democratic senators, who may subscribe to a living constitutionalist view of the law, may start to research progressive approaches to originalism, such as that of Professor Jack Balkin,20
19 347 US 483 (1954). See Barnett, Our Republican Constitution at 120-23, 160-63
(cited in note 11) (discussing why Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896), was wrong on
originalist grounds, and how Brown represented the redemption of our republican
Constitution).
20 See generally Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Belknap 2011). Professor Balkin has argued that the Constitution is "an initial framework for governance that sets
politics in motion, [ ] that Americans must fill out over time through constitutional construction"). Id at 3.
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to ask more informed questions. Even if the senators cannot agree
on the result, an agreement on the framework would be a monumental shift forward.
We believe it is reasonable to expect our hypothetical nominee's confirmation hearing to become a "teaching moment" that
would influence a Justice's jurisprudence once confirmed. Plus,
the executive branch attorneys selecting nominees will begin to
inquire at the vetting stages about originalism-lest they avoid
an embarrassing moment-forcing the short listers to discuss this
methodology.
Who knows? Lower court judges who seek elevation to the
Supreme Court may even write originalist opinions as an audition
for the big show. (This sort of historical education cannot be
crammed into murder board sessions; it takes a lifetime of study.)
And if we dream big, we can even imagine constitutional law professors teaching future judges something about the Constitution's
original meaning. (Oh well, we can dream.)
Above all, such hearings would demonstrate the gravitational
force of originalism: even where a nonoriginalist precedent exists,
the tug of the original Constitution exudes an undeniable and irresistible force on our body politic.21 No nominee would be con-

firmable who expressly denied the relevance of the questions being asked. For example, during Justice William Brennan's
confirmation hearing in 1956, he wisely declined to answer a
question about whether "the Constitution and amendments
thereto have a fixed and definite meaning when they are
adopted."22 Even "five-finger" Brennan could not bring himself to
say in his confirmation hearing what he would practice from the
bench. Five decades later, taking the wiser tack, Justice Kagan
proudly proclaimed that "we are all originalists."23

No candidate would be deemed qualified who was unable to
answer questions like these. With the information revealed by
such hearings, senators would be in a position to vote, as they did

21 Randy Barnett, The GravitationalForce of Originalism, 82 Fordham L Rev 411,
421 (2013) ("[O]riginalism has a kind of gravitational force that affects legal doctrine in
significant ways.") (quotation marks omitted); Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of
Originalism, 16 Chapman L Rev 325, 326 (2013) ("Even when originalism is not at the
forefront, this jurisprudence exudes a gravitational pull that tugs at the Constitution, and
prevents it from drifting too far away [from] its original meaning.") (emphasis omitted).
22 Nomination of William JosephBrennan, Jr.: Hearings before the Committee on the
Judiciary United States Senate, 85th Cong, 1st Sess 36 (1957).
23
The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate,
111th Cong, 2d Sess 62 (2010).
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with Bork, based on whether or not they agreed with the judicial
philosophy of a nominee. If a nominee replies that these historical
sources are not relevant, or not worth studying, then that is an
entirely justifiable ground for voting no. But if future nominees
affirm their relevance, they will be affirming the value of original
meaning.
Now that would be something.
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